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Introduction
The market for cultural goods is arguably one of the most international-
ized. Van Gogh’s paintings can be admired in New York, a large collection
of Egyptian art is on display in Berlin, Isabel Allende’s and Thomas Mann’s
books are popular in Europe and the Americas alike, the Beatles’ and
Madonna’s CDs are sold throughout the world, and Hollywood movies
have global coverage. Yet this phenomenon is not uniform: the market
share of American ﬁlms in Europe is much higher than that of European
ﬁlms in the USA and it is fair to say that Pop-Art had a larger inﬂuence on
the European culture than traditional Javanese paintings. Why is that?
What determines the pattern of trade in cultural goods? 
Trade theory explains why sellers (mostly producers) of certain goods
reside in diﬀerent jurisdictions from the buyers/consumers of these prod-
ucts. In order to understand the trade pattern we need to know what deter-
mines the demand for foreign art and its supply; that is, what determines
consumption of foreign art and under which conditions the respective cul-
tural goods are produced. In both dimensions cultural goods are distinc-
tively diﬀerent from most other goods.1
The demand for cultural goods in the international market
The demand for cultural goods is characterized by the positive addiction in
consumption of cultural goods. The idea goes back to Alfred Marshall,
who wrote ‘It is therefore no exception to the law [of diminishing marginal
utility] that the more good music a man hears, the stronger is his taste for
it likely to become’ (Marshall, 1962, p.94). Marginal utility from cultural
consumption increases with the ability to appreciate (a particular form of)
cultural goods, which is a function of past consumption (Stigler and
Becker, 1977). In the course of consuming cultural goods, such as enjoying
Flemish painters or French ﬁlms noirs, art-speciﬁc ‘consumption capital’ is
built up. Marginal utility from cultural consumption increases with the
accumulation of consumption capital and therefore rises over time. This
leads to an actual shift in the demand for the speciﬁc cultural goods without
a change in prices or income. Empirical evidence for such an addictive eﬀect
of art consumption is ample (for example, Smith, 1998). Becker (1996)
distinguishes two components of consumption capital: personal capital,
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which is formed out of past consumption and other relevant individual
experience,2 and social capital, which represents the inﬂuence of others on
a person’s utility, namely the inﬂuence of peers or relevant others. Social
capital can be inﬂuenced by the individuals, only to a limited degree, by the
choice of the social milieu they live in. Part of social capital is cultural
capital (see Throsby, 1999) which is given for the individual.
In the international context, this notion of positive addiction has two
implications. First, people value cultural goods from abroad less as long
as they have not accumulated enough personal consumption capital for
this unfamiliar art; social capital is likewise underdeveloped as their peers
have not accumulated consumption capital for this art either. This cultu-
ral discount vis-à-vis domestic art limits the degree of trade: the closer
(national) cultures are, the smaller the diﬀerence in the relevant consump-
tion capital and, thus, the larger the bilateral trade in art. This cultural
discount can be asymmetric; one country can accumulate consumption
capital for the other country’s culture, but the opposite need not be true.
There is no clear theory of how social and individual cultural consump-
tion capital is built up, but it is clear that this happens. The more con-
sumption capital is built up, the easier its further accumulation, until
foreign-origin cultural goods become part of the national culture. Trade
levels go up and remain high. This describes the second eﬀect, hysteresis,
in trade in cultural goods. These arguments imply that trade in art is a pos-
itive function of cultural proximity and that current trade is a positive
function of past trade. Still, this does not predict the pattern of trade in
art; we need to look also at the supply side in the international market for
cultural goods.
The supply of cultural goods: a classiﬁcation
Cultural goods comprise very heterogeneous products such as sculptures
and statues, original paintings, CDs and DVDs, books, ﬁlms for cinema
and TV, prints and so on. From an economic perspective, they fall into two
categories:3 unique cultural goods (such as original paintings and sculp-
tures, antiques) and reproducible cultural goods (recorded music and ﬁlms,
literature and so on).
Reproducible cultural goods are produced in two steps, the creative step
in which the artist creates the blueprint (that is, the manuscript, the origi-
nal recording, the master copy of the ﬁlm) and the reproduction step in
which the master copy is industrially copied under strongly increasing
returns to scale, and marketed.4 This makes the ﬁnal products relatively
cheap and thus (international) trade takes place predominantly between
producers and consumers (‘primary market’).5 Note that artists (bands,
authors and so on) and the companies that reproduce the original work
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(labels, publishers) need not reside in the same country, so that there may
be a second international transaction, an international art service which is
paid for in royalties. Trade can thus be explained by a Dixit–Stiglitz-type
monopolistic competition model of international trade in diﬀerentiated
products (see Wong, 1995, ch. 6).
In contrast, original paintings, sculptures, drawings and so on are pro-
duced in a single – creative – step without scale economies. They are unique
and highly durable and thus precious, which makes them a storage of value
and creates a strong ‘secondary market’, that is a market between former
and future consumers. The observable substantial price increases for these
goods demonstrate that additions of the primary market to the secondary
market’s stock are insuﬃcient to satisfy rising demand for these collectors’
items and thus the secondary market dominates the primary market, partly
also because of low substitutability between the stock of old art objects and
the new products. This makes international trade in works of art demand-
determined, as both sellers and buyers are consumers, and thereby distin-
guishes it from trade in most other products.
Before we turn to the characteristics of trade in these two types of cul-
tural goods, a remark on the magnitude of international trade in cultural
goods is in order. It is very hard to measure the actual trade in cultural
goods and services, not only because these groups are not easily deﬁned,
but also because many of the international transactions are reﬂected in
transborder royalty payments, for which consistent data are hard to ﬁnd,
and not in crossborder movements of physical goods.6 Table 1 shows the
average trade for 1990–94 for 154 countries and selected categories of cul-
tural goods.
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Table 1 Average trade in selected groups of cultural goods as deﬁned by
SITC, 1990–94
Works of Sound Books Total
art recordings etc. manufacturing
(SITC 8960) (SITC 8983) (SITC 8921) trade
Volume of trade 10.569 18.27 8.441 3586.802
(billion US$)
Percentage of total 0.30 0.51 0.240 100
trade in manufactures
Note: The data exclude transborder royalty payments.
Source: Schulze (1999).
Trade in unique art 
Trade in unique art is demand-driven and this demand in turn is a function
of the income level as works of art are luxury goods. Demand also depends
on cultural proximity, which should have a substantially stronger impact on
the trade of works in art than on total trade. Schulze (2002) compares the
pattern of trade in works of art with the total manufacturing trade pattern
in a gravity model which links gross bilateral trade ﬂows to the country sizes
of both countries as measured by GDP, the geographical distance between
the two countries, the income levels (GPD per capita) and dummies for a
common border, a common language and for countries that are members
of the same trade bloc.
The ﬁndings are consistent with the theoretical predictions: the eﬀect of
GDP per capita of the importing country is signiﬁcantly stronger for works
of art than for total trade, pointing towards a higher income elasticity of
demand. Also the variables that capture cultural proximity – distance and a
common language – exert a much stronger inﬂuence on trade in unique art
than on total trade. People have closer ties to and have built up more con-
sumption capital for nearby cultures; likewise, a common language not only
facilitates cultural exchange but often is tied to a common (mostly colonial)
history. It turns out that people trade ﬁve times as much in works of art if
they have a language in common, which is 2.5 times the factor for total trade.7
Trade in reproducible cultural goods
While trade in unique art establishes a particularity not only because of the
special demand characteristics and therefore the importance of cultural
proximity, but also because works of art are the only group of products
where the secondary market dominates the primary one,8 the latter does not
apply for reproducible art. For these goods cultural discounts are likewise
important and this relates to the diﬀerent cultures of the artists (ﬁrst pro-
duction step) and the consumers, not the country of reproduction. Repro-
duction is characterized by strong scale economies: once a manuscript is
written, it is cheap to reproduce additional copies of the book. This
explains why (re)production of a particular cultural good is concentrated
in one location. At the same time, production of many cultural goods is
characterized by strong economies of scope at the ﬁrm level as a substan-
tial part of ﬁxed costs are not tied to the production process of one partic-
ular product (a certain CD) only, but to producing similar products (CDs
in general). Production facilities (CD production plants) and distribution
networks are eﬃciently used only if used for many similar products. This
explains the existence of labels, ﬁlm studios and publishing houses. In addi-
tion there may be economies of scale at the industry level, which may be
local, national or international, depending on the industry.
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The movie industry may serve as an important example (see Frank,
1993). Obviously, reproduction is characterized by economies of scale as it
is easy to copy ﬁlm rolls. Production and marketing are characterized by
scope economies as studios, marketing departments and distribution net-
works can serve for production and especially ﬁnancing and sale of many
ﬁlms at rapidly decreasing unit cost. Another reason is the high risk
involved in ﬁlm making: studios pool the risk and thus serve as an insu-
rance device, a function which capital markets may not fulﬁl equally well as
knowledge is highly industry-speciﬁc. This explains the existence of the big
studios. The making of the ﬁlm itself requires highly specialized labour –
actors, stuntmen, cameramen, stylists and so on – for a very limited period
of time who make a living by working consecutively or even simultaneously
in many movie productions, also for diﬀerent studios. As ﬂexibility and
short-term availability are important, this creates a specialized localized
labour market and thus local economies of scale at the industry level. This
explains the existence of Hollywood or ‘Bollywood’ (Bombay), the concen-
tration of the movies industry in one place in a country.
The dominance of American ﬁlms in the Western world is explained by
the concurrence of scale economies in supply and the demand characteris-
tics for cultural goods. Since initially the cultural discount works both ways,
and domestic ﬁlms are preferred to foreign ﬁlms, the ﬁlm industry in the
larger home market will have larger total sales as it faces cultural discounts
in the demand for its ﬁlms for a smaller portion of the world market
(Wildman and Siwek, 1988; Frank, 1993). Given strong scale economies in
ﬁlm production, this eﬀect allows the larger country’s ﬁlm industry to lower
its prices or to increase its ﬁxed (production) costs and thereby to try to
enhance the quality of its products. Either way, it gains a competitive edge
and enjoys a higher market penetration in the foreign countries than foreign
ﬁlms in its home country. Market penetration in foreign markets will build
up consumption capital and reduce the cultural discount until eventually
American ﬁlms have become part of European culture. The opposite does
not hold to the same extent – trade in ﬁlms may become a one-way street.
Although this phenomenon is not uniform for all countries, empirical
evidence is consistent with this theory. In 1999, the market shares for
domestic ﬁlms were 92 per cent in the USA, 14 per cent in Germany, 17 per
cent in the UK, 32 per cent in France and 0.5 per cent in Belgium. The
market sizes in terms of movie attendances were 1480m. for the USA, com-
pared to 880m. for the EU (Germany 149m., UK 140m., France 154m.,
Belgium 22m. and so on). This explains the ﬁlm trade pattern, for instance,
for Germany: Germany paid DM 1327m. in royalties for imported ﬁlms, 71
per cent of which to the USA, and earned only DM 74m. in royalties from
exported ﬁlms (11 per cent of which from the USA).9
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Government intervention in the international trade in cultural goods
The observed trade patterns for both types of cultural goods are also partly
a result of various government interventions. For instance, according to
Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome, the EU member states have the right to
protect their national patrimony through export restrictions for works of art
(embargos, export licensing, pre-emptive rights to purchase works of art to
be exported) and they are free to deﬁne what they regard as their national
patrimony. VAT regulations may distort trade as well: within the EU, works
of art are taxed at the margin (on the diﬀerence between purchasing and
selling price) according to the origin principle, which disfavours high VAT
countries. On imports of works of art into the EU, the import VAT is levied
mostly at reduced rates which diﬀer substantially between countries, favour-
ing low-tax countries such as the UK. The droit de suite entitles artists to a
fraction of the gross selling price each time their works of art are resold.
This right functions like a turnover tax and thus may divert trade away from
countries that enforce these resale royalty rights. The EU has decided on
introducing a uniform droit de suite on a sliding scale with a derogation
period between ﬁve and ten years for some countries, whereas the important
art markets of Switzerland and the USA do not have resale royalty rights.
Lastly, direct subsidies to art museums or indirect subsidies to art institu-
tions and private individuals in the form of tax incentives (wealth and inher-
itance tax exemptions, income tax deductions for donations to art
institutions, acceptance of art objects in lieu of tax payments) increase the
incentive for residents to acquire or to hold art, and thus distort trade.
Government interventions in the movie industries are also frequent. This
refers not only to direct subsidization of the domestic ﬁlm industry (also in
the form of lucrative awards), but also to local content requirements for
national TV.10 These measures increase the supply of and the demand for
domestically produced ﬁlms and therefore reduce imports and increase
exports. To what extent government interventions actually distort trade is
of course an empirical matter which to date remains largely unresolved.
Notes
1. The following two sections draw on Schulze (1999). For normative issues of trade in cul-
tural goods, see, for example, van Hemel et al. (1996) and O’Hagan (1998, ch. 4, 6).
2. This includes the interaction with others. This helps to explain the emergence of super-
stars. See entry ‘Superstars’ in this volume.
3. We disregard live performances like concerts, plays and so on which are internationally
tradable services if bands or theatre companies tour abroad.
4. The second step can be divided into functionally deﬁned substeps (production, ﬁnanc-
ing, marketing, distribution). See below, ‘Trade in reproducible cultural goods’.
5. This does not exclude possible intermediaries such as foreign publishers, so that the
international trade can also take place between the producer and the foreign intermedi-
ary and the subsequent sale is between this intermediary and a consumer.
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6. One example is the case of a domestic publisher who sells the right for a foreign edition
of a book to a foreign publisher.
7. The other results are as follows: art trade rises more than proportionally with GDP, a
common trade bloc increases trade signiﬁcantly and a common border does not increase
trade in addition to the proximity as measured by geographical distance.
8. The only other exception is antiques and scientiﬁc collections, which are in the same
SITC category.
9. All data refer to 1999; source: Roth (2001, pp.80–87).
10. For the Canadian case, see Acheson and Maule (1992); for Germany see Perino and
Schulze (2003).
See also:
Chapter 21: Cultural statistics; Chapter 31: Globalization; Chapter 54: Superstars.
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